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Henry George’s single tax on land is an elusive concept to implement, because land is 
occupied by a variety of buildings or is undeveloped. Land value is undefined since the 
value of the land lying under buildings is difficult to estimate and does not correspond to 
real market value. Therefore, it is hard to find taxes that are accurately related to land 
value and, hence, to the ability to pay and still satisfy George’s axiom. Static models 
unrealistically pretend that all the land is available in the market at all points in time. To 
properly treat dynamics, a generalized perfect-foresight model of real estate markets 
solvable by simulation is presented. Using a version of this model stripped-down to its 
bare essentials, the effects of the conventional ad-valorem property tax and of an ad-
valorem tax on undeveloped land are analyzed. We show a new result that the 
conventional tax speeds up the demolition-reconstruction cycle, shortening the life span 
of buildings and thus resulting in excessive use of structural capital over time, while a tax 
on undeveloped land has the opposite effects. We then turn to the application of the 
dynamic simulation model to the optimal taxation problem adapted to real estate markets. 
In this problem a different tax rate is levied on each type of undeveloped land and each 
type of building to meet a desired revenue goal, recognizing the different price elasticities 
of demand and supply for these assets. The formulation is designed to calculate 
deadweight losses associated with such optimal taxation schemes.         
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The Henry George (1879) single tax is a tax on land. But how should the tax be 
levied? The simplest example would be a lump sum tax on each unit of land to be paid 
regardless of what is to be done with that land and disregarding whether it is currently 
developed or not. Such a tax system is generally presumed to be neutral as George had 
envisioned. And, it is presumed, one could vary the tax from one unit of land to the other: 
the implied tax rate as a proportion of land value would not have to be the same 
everywhere to achieve neutrality. But such a lump sum tax system − while probably 
deserving a lot more attention than it has gotten − would be considered inequitable unless 
it is related either to the benefits received by the owners of the land or to the landowner’s 
ability to pay. Arguably, in an efficient capital market, the best measure of a landowner’s 
ability to pay is his land value. 
       But can tax authorities or econometricians accurately measure the value of land 
covered with buildings? Mills (1998) has argued that they cannot. The consequences of 
inaccurate measurement could be quite severe. Consider the example of an owner of a 
building who is planning to demolish his building and sell the land because that is the 
most profitable action. Suppose that the tax authority, not knowing the land value, sets 
                                                            
1 The research was supported by a David C. Lincoln Fellowship from the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy. The paper was presented at 
the Lincoln Institute conference on “The Property Tax, Land Use and Land Use Regulation”, Scottsdale, Arizona, 13-15 January, 
2002. The author is solely responsible for the contents and the views expressed.   3 
the lump sum tax on this owner so high that the after-tax value of the land that will be 
released by demolition becomes negative.
2 In a free society, if the owner were fully 
rational, he would abandon the building if all other alternatives yielded a negative return  
and if – by doing so – the tax could be avoided. Inducing abandonment in this way would 
be distorting and, hence, inefficient. To avoid the distortion and restore efficiency, 
owners could be forced to pay the tax even if abandoning. Knowing that they could so be 
forced, they would not abandon because they would reduce their losses by demolishing 
and selling the land. Such a prohibition of abandonment is a form of fascism. 
Alternatively, society could also restore efficiency by taking over and demolishing the 
abandoned building. Arguably, this is a form of socialism. To avoid both extremes, the 
tax authority and the building’s owner could negotiate the tax down to some reasonable 
level. That, of course, is neither fascism nor socialism. But, at worst, it opens the door to 
corrupt dealings between landowners and tax authorities. At best, it increases the 
transaction costs involved in determining a reasonable tax. So we should look for land tax 
instruments that are easy to administer at arms length and are based on observable 
measures of value.
3            
        The modern literature on land taxation, implicitly recognizing the importance of tax 
schemes related to the ability to pay, has focused on ad-valorem taxes that maintain 
proportionality between the tax paid and the “true land value” so that all landowners  
faced the same tax rate. But all these modern attempts run into the basic question: “what 
is the true land value that should be taxed?” Looking at the world, we see at least two 
                                                            
2 This is more likely to be the case if land value is a relatively small part of property value as is the case in 
the United States. 
3 Of course, the same pitfalls exist for taxes proportional to assessed values if those values cannot be 
accurately calculated as they are unlikely to be for land occupied by buildings.    4 
types of land. The first is land that is undeveloped or vacant in the sense that there is no 
building on it. The second type of land is land that is occupied by a building of some sort 
or having minimal infrastructure improvements on it or near it, making it suitable for 
supporting buildings at a later date. Further scrutiny reveals additional complexity. The 
types of buildings as well as the types of vacant land that we see vary enormously in their 
underlying economics. There are, for example, tall buildings (e.g. skyscrapers) that are, 
for economic reasons, extremely unlikely to be demolished any time soon. Hence, the 
land that they occupy is virtually locked out from the active market for land. There are, as 
well, shorter buildings in poor structural condition that are very likely to be demolished 
and could make their underlying land available for some other type of building to be 
constructed. Buildings can also be changed (from apartments to offices for example) 
without affecting the underlying land or their structural density. To make a long story 
short, virtually every piece of land is a different type of land with a different propensity 
to remain in its present use or to become recycled into some other.  
         Looking at things in this way gives rise to a situation that is far different from 
George’s idealized view. While it is still true that the aggregate supply of land is fixed for 
all practical purposes, the supply of vacant land at any one place is not at all fixed. More 
vacant land can be created by demolition of buildings and the supply of it is far from 
inelastic in general. Meanwhile, the supply of a particular type of building at a location 
can be very elastic or very inelastic depending − among other things − on the costs of 
construction, demolition, conversion without demolition, as well as the availability of 
vacant land nearby. These elasticities also depend on time horizons.    5 
        Given the above realistic way of looking at what we mean by a “land market” what 
exactly is to be understood by a single rate ad-valorem tax on land value? It is perhaps 
best to approach this question gradually by making a brief review of recently published 
modeling exercises by several urban economists who treated the response of an entire 
land market to different tax structures. These are the recent static models by Mills (1998), 
Brueckner (1999) and Brueckner and Kim (2000) in which an idealized, homogeneous 
and instantly available land market exists by assumption. These authors examined the 
land tax in the context of the monocentric city of urban economics. They drew 
conclusions about the effects on physical city size and land use within such a city arising 
from a revenue-neutral switch from a conventional ad-valorem property tax falling on 
land and structures at the same rate, to a hypothetical pure ad-valorem land tax falling on 
land only. Mills examined a monocentric city containing exporting businesses only and 
open to the in and out-migration of these businesses. He showed that the switch to the 
land tax increased the capital per acre (structural density) that businesses would employ 
throughout the city. Because this increases the productivity of each acre, the rent-distance 
function rises and the city expands in radius and in total output. Brueckner examined a 
city of housing consumers closed in population and showed that the switch to a land tax 
causes the after-tax cost of capital to fall and thus the structural density of housing to rise 
on each acre. Dwelling sizes and total population being constant, the city shrinks in 
radius (less urban sprawl occurs). In Brueckner and Kim, it is shown that this result can 
be reversed if dwelling sizes are not constant. The lower after-tax cost of structural 
capital, arising from the switch to the single tax, increases the dwelling size demanded by 
each consumer while also increasing the structural density of buildings. If the dwelling-  6 
size effect dominates, there could be fewer households on each acre even with taller 
buildings on each acre and a city of a given total household population could expand in 
radius causing more not less sprawl.             
       The above models being static, they cannot shed light on the dynamic effects of 
taxes. Dynamic analyses that can treat conversions involving buildings and land is 
needed. A paper by Arnott (1998) is a step in this direction and a good summary of 
earlier literature.
4 He considered how to devise a neutral tax on a single 
developer/landowner rather than devise such a tax system for a whole land market. The 
developer in question has a unit of vacant land to build on and he decides, under perfect 
foresight, when to build and at what structural density. However, once he builds, the 
building remains undemolished forever. Arnott looks for a neutral tax in this context, a 
tax that is neutral with respect to the timing (when to develop the unit vacant land) as 
well as the density of development, and also raises the desired revenue. Arnott shows 
how to achieve such neutrality by the coordinated setting of three separate taxes all 
related to some concept of value. The first tax is on the pre-development value of the 
land, defined as “what the land is worth in its vacant state before it is developed.” The 
second tax is on the post-development residual site value, defined as “property value 
minus the depreciated cost of the structure on the site.” The third tax is a subsidy on the 
structural capital employed on the site.   
       The purpose of the current paper is to present a more general and complete  
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debated the neutrality of alternative land taxes. Bentick (1979), Kanemoto (1985) and Turnbull (1988) 
focused on the effects of taxation on the timing and efficiency of development. But none of these authors 
considered demolition as we do in this article.   7 
theoretical framework and empirically useful modeling tool for analyzing alternative tax 
structures on buildings and land over an entire real estate market. Using such a 
framework in a dynamic context, it should be possible to devise alternative tax structures 
and make revenue-neutral comparisons among them, quantifying the deadweight losses 
of these alternative tax structures. Clearly, a dynamic model properly grounded in 
economic theory is the appropriate approach for such a research program. To this end, I 
will use the model that I have developed in earlier work with Richard Arnott, and I will 
modify it to deal with problems of property taxation and optimal property taxation.
5   
        The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the structure of the model and 
the solution properties in the case where there are no taxes on buildings and land. 
(Appendix A is a technical appendix that explains how some of the relationships used in 
the model are derived.) In Appendix B, I describe a computational algorithm (Anas and 
Choi (2001)) that we have designed to solve the dynamic simulation model with 
exogenously specified taxes on building submarkets (or building types) and on land. 
Then, in Section 3, I strip the model down to its bare essentials and investigate several 
simple properties of it in the presence of alternative taxation schemes for stationary state 
dynamics. By performing comparative statics on such a stationary state, I compare a tax 
on undeveloped land to a conventional property tax that falls on land and buildings at the 
same rate. I show that the conventional tax causes inefficient use of structural capital, 
because it speeds up the construction-demolition cycle shortening the lives of buildings.  
In the intensive margin of building replacement, this results in excessive use of structural 
capital over time on each unit amount of land. But the conventional tax also works in the 
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the earlier publications on this model and its empirical application.     8 
extensive margin, resulting in a lower stock of buildings (fewer units of land are 
developed). Hence, unlike what is commonly believed, the total amount of structural 
capital used over time would decrease only if the extensive margin effect dominated the 
intensive margin effect. I also show that the tax on undeveloped land works in the 
opposite way, offsetting − even though imperfectly − the inefficiencies of the 
conventional tax. (These results are summarized in the text and the details of the analysis 
are in Appendix C.) The Mills or Brueckner models discussed earlier are static models 
and thus ignore the intensive margin of building replacement although they treat the other 
intensive margin of structural density. The intensive margin of building replacement is 
also absent from Arnott’s model who also treats structural density but does not consider 
demolition. In his model, development is clay-putty: once buildings are constructed they 
remain in place forever. In Section 4, I present a generalized optimal taxation problem 
that can be solved using an extended formulation of the dynamic model of Section 2. In 
this formulation, there is a different tax rate on vacant land and on each building type and 
these taxes can be optimized for every year over a planning period. The “optimal taxation 
problem” is a well-known textbook problem in economics. In this textbook version, it is 
recognized that the price elasticity of demand varies a great deal from commodity to 
commodity. Efficiency requires levying a higher tax rate on those commodities for which 
the demand is relatively price inelastic and a lower tax rate on those for which the 
demand is relatively price elastic. How does the setting of this textbook problem differ 
from that of the real estate market with land? It should be natural to view buildings in 
different sub-markets and vacant land in different locations as being different 
commodities. As explained earlier, we also know that the price elasticities of demand for   9 
these buildings and land will differ as will also the price elasticities of supply. In that 
sense, our problem is similar to the textbook problem but somewhat more complex. I 
leave solution of this optimal taxation problem to future work. Part of the research 
program is to embed the simulation procedure described in Section 2 into a more general 
algorithm that can determine the optimal tax rates taking the interdependent demand and 
supply elasticities into account.  
2.  Structure of Model  
We now turn to a description of the simulation model.
6 The description presented  
here follows closely that in Anas, Arnott and Yamazaki (2000).
7 
     2.1 Basic Assumptions 
     Time consists of periods of equal length (years). Time t denotes the start of year t and 
time t+1, the end of year t. t = 0 denotes the present (initial) year. Variables change only 
at the start or end of each year. The model incorporates idiosyncratic uncertainty on both 
the demand and the supply sides. For example, at the start of each year, consumers of 
buildings learn the idiosyncratic components of their tastes, earn incomes, choose their 
most preferred submarket and pay rents, while investors receive  
rents and bid on vacant land or building assets determining asset prices, prior to learning 
their idiosyncratic costs.
8 Idiosyncratic costs of maintenance for buildings for the year, 
are revealed a bit after the start of a year, while costs of construction, structural 
                                                            
6 The model is consistent with theory. But I refer to it as a “simulation model” because simulation is the 
only practical way to solve it in the general case.  
7 The model follows discrete choice theory. Despite my efforts over the years, the approach is still 
considered unorthodox within urban economics. But its enormous advantage is that it lends itself to direct 
empirical and numerical implementation of the theoretical models without sacrificing the theoretical form 
of the model equations (see Anas and Arnott (1993c, 1994, 1997). This contrasts with orthodox urban 
economics where, with few exceptions, authors develop a theoretical model and then have to switch to 
some reduced form, vaguely related to the theoretical model, to test it empirically.   10 
conversion or demolition are revealed just before the end of a year. The timeline in Table 
1 illustrates the sequence in investor and consumer actions and in the revelation of 
information within a year. The left column shows when a particular item of information 
is revealed and the right side shows the decisions that follow. 
      The  building  stock  is  divided  into  k=1…K building types or submarkets. Each 
submarket represents a different combination of size (e.g. floor space), physical quality,  
structural density or location. k=0 represents vacant land.
9 Buildings consist of structure  
and land. Buildings can be created from land via construction or from buildings of other 
types via structural conversions. Land is created by demolitions of buildings. is the lot 




is construction density. 
, for k > 0, is the number of  building units of type k, used up in the conversion 
process, to create one unit of type k′ and 
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is the k →k′ conversion density. Of course, 
 for all k >0.  The vector S t=] [ is the stock (number of unit 
buildings
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,..., 1 Kt t V V
,..., Kt R
10) in each submarket (or land for k=0) in year t. The total amount of land 
(vacant plus occupied by buildings) is A t and is exogenous for each t. We will normally 
assume that A t= A for each year t.  V t=] [ is the vector of asset prices for 
buildings and land in year t, and R t=] [  is the vector of land and building  R
                                                                                                                                                                             
8 By “building” we refer to any type of building such as single family home, apartment building, office 
building etc. Consumers of buildings can be households or business establishments. 
9 The model is here presented for a single land market, but in Anas and Arnott (1993c, 1994, 1997) it has 
been applied to metropolitan housing markets (e.g. Chicago) with two (city and suburban) land markets.  
 
10 A “unit building” is the quantity a building consumer wants to consume. In the case of housing 
consumers, a “unit building” is a whole housing unit. In the case of business establishments it could be 
viewed, for example, as a unit amount of floor space in a building.   11 
rents (per unit building) in year t. The asset price of a unit building includes the value of 
the land on which the unit is built. The rent for vacant land,  , is exogenously given for 
each t and the initial stock vector S , is exogenous as an initial condition.
t R0
0
11 All other  
elements of the rent, stock and asset price vectors are endogenous for each t. 
         As noted, a unique feature of the model is that it treats stochastic heterogeneity at 
the level of individual agents on both the demand and the supply sides of the market. The 
chief reason for doing so is to achieve empirical realism in applied studies (e.g. Anas and 
Arnott (1993c,1994, 1997) as well as smooth computational solutions. On the demand 
side, consumers who belong to the same group differ in the idiosyncratic taste constants 
they attach to building submarkets. On the supply side, building units differ in 
idiosyncratic costs of maintenance for occupied and vacant units as well as in the costs of 
converting those units to land or to other units. Similarly, there are idiosyncratic costs in 
converting land to buildings. We assume that each idiosyncratic utility or cost is a draw 
each year from the following double exponential distribution, known as the Gumbel and 
given by (1) below. We assume that all agents know the distribution of utility or cost and 
its mean for each alternative, but learn the value of their idiosyncratic deviation from the 
mean only after it is realized. 
(1)   exp = < z G  , γ > 0,    )] ( [exp ) ( η γ − − − z x
where x stands for a random realization of  idiosyncratic utility or cost. The distribution 
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11 That the vacant land rent is exogenous is analogous to the assumption of exogenous agricultural rent in 
the models by Mills (1998), Brueckner (1999), Brueckner and Kim (2000) or Arnott  (1998) discussed 
earlier. Of course, there is no loss of generality in assuming that the rent for vacant land is zero.    12 
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swamps nonrandom effects, making choices extremely heterogeneous. Then, all choices 
are most preferred with the same probability. 
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      Closure Property of (1): The Gumbel distribution given by (1) has the property that it 
is closed under the maximization operation. Hence, if n random variates 
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parameter γ. The proof is in Appendix A.  
 
      This  closure  property  implies,  for  example, that the distribution of a maximized 
objective in a population of maximizing agents has the same distribution as the un-
maximized objective has in the same population of agents. Thus, aggregation across 
maximizing agents does not affect the ex post distribution of the maximized objective. 
This further implies that welfare comparisons can be made knowing that two different 
policies which affect individual objectives will not affect the variance of the maximized 
objective in the population of agents.  
        While  the  model  will  be  stochastic  at  the  level  of  consumers  and  investors  as 
explained above, there is no uncertainty at the aggregate level. Hence, rents, asset prices 
and stocks are all obtained as deterministic variables. Asset prices are deterministic 
because risk-neutral investors bid on buildings and on land before the uncertainty in costs   13 
is realized. Hence, at the time of bidding, investors are ex ante identical and make the 
same bids. The model solves for the expected stock distribution as a function of 
deterministic asset prices and for the expected allocation of households among 
submarkets as a function of deterministic rents.      
       2.2 Demand Side: Consumers 
        Consumers view submarkets as internally homogeneous. Hence, they are indifferent 
about choice within a submarket. After learning his idiosyncratic realization of utilities 
for each submarket for that year, a consumer chooses the most-preferred submarket and 
randomly selects a unit building to rent within that submarket. Each consumer 
reevaluates his choice at the start of each period and can costlessly relocate. We treat 
consumers as myopic and we assume that they neither borrow nor save. We divide them 
into h = 1…H demand groups according to socioeconomic types (income, family size, 
age of household head or race). N t  is the exogenous vector of the number 
of consumers per year in each demand group. y t=[ ,…, ] is the exogenous income 
of a consumer in demand group h in year t.






12 Y t=] [  is a vector of submarket 
qualities and   is the marginal utility of quality. Then, U  is the utility a 
consumer enjoys from renting a unit building in submarket k in year t. 
, is the utility of submarket k which is common to all consumers of 
type h.   measures an idiosyncratic submarket-specific utility varying around mean 
utility   for consumers of type h.  For each consumer of type h, idiosyncratic utilities 
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12 For businesses, we may think of this as the net income before rent is paid, for example.   14 
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 Appendix A also proves that, under the closure property of (1) described above, the ex 
ante expected value of the maximized utility level (or expected consumer surplus) of a 
consumer in group h at the start of year t is: 
(3)               Ψ (R t)  =
K hzt htU K ) exp( ... 1 δ . 
       2.3 Supply Side: Investors 
       Investors are risk neutral and perfectly competitive. As shown in Table 1, investors 
value buildings or land at the beginning of each year, knowing only the probability 
distribution of the idiosyncratic costs they will encounter later. Let C t=[C ] be the 
(K+1)×(K+1) matrix of expected k to k′ conversion costs for t>0, and let c t=[ ] be the 
corresponding (K+1)×(K+1) matrix of idiosyncratic conversion costs per unit of type k′ 
building for t>0, measured as a deviation from the expected cost. These are revealed right 
before the end of year t. Also, let D ot =[ , D =[ , be the 
expected maintenance costs for type k (k > 0) occupied and vacant units common to 
investors, with d =[ , d =[ , the idiosyncratic deviations from 
the respective expected costs. These are revealed right after the start of year t. For each 
t k k ′
]
t k k c ′
,...,D
,..., Kvt d
Kvt D  15 
investor, the   and the   are drawn from (1) for each submarket and for 
land with dispersion parameters Φ  and  , and means 
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procedure of Appendix A, gives the binomial logit: 
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From Appendix A, under the closure property, the expected profit of this occupancy 
decision at the start of year t, is 
(5)           ω  
For vacant land, we assume that it can always be rented for the exogenous land rent. 
Hence,   Now note that year-end conversion profits from type k to type k′ 
asset, discounted to the start of year t are 
0t ω




Pr k k t k = ′
. The probability that 
an investor who holds asset type k = 0,1,…,K at the start of  year t will choose to convert 
to type k′  just before the end of year t is Q  for all k′∈ 
B(k), where B(k) is the set of asset types to which a type k asset can be converted and 
 for all k′∉B(k).   0 = ′t k k Q
       Figure 1 illustrates two (of many) possible ways of defining the sets B(k), for three 
building types and land. We will refer to these as alternative conversion technologies. For 
realism, it should be assumed that k∈ B(k), for each k, so that it is always possible to keep   16 
a building at its current submarket state by incurring expenditure C . Figure 1a shows a 
quality hierarchy of buildings. Supposing that structural densities are the same for all 
these buildings, they differ only in structural quality. Buildings are constructed at the 
highest quality (quality 3 in the example of the figure) and – depending on the cost 
shocks experienced – can either stay in the same quality level or deteriorate only one 
quality interval per time period. Only the lowest quality buildings can be demolished. 
Thus, a quality cycle is implied where buildings deteriorate gradually (and some faster 
than others depending on idiosyncratic cost shocks experienced) until they are 
demolished and the new highest quality buildings are built on the land released by the 
demolition. So, the owner of the lowest quality building can change his asset to a highest 
quality building over at least two periods: he demolishes in period 1 and builds the 
highest quality building in period 2. Figure 1b illustrates a situation in which there are 
three buildings that differ in structural density (unlike the first part of the figure) but not 
in quality. Each structural density can be demolished or constructed. To change from one 
structural density to another on the same land requires at least two periods: the existing 
structural density is demolished in the current period and the desired structural density is 
constructed in the next period.  
kkt
      The procedure of Appendix A now yields the following multinomial logit for year-
end conversion probabilities in year t (i.e. the probability that an owner of a type k asset 
will convert it to a type k′ in year t): 
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where   if k′∈ B(k), and b if k′∉B(k). Those owners who undertake 
the conversion are those who draw (are shocked by) a low idiosyncratic conversion cost 
. From Appendix A, applying the closure property, the expected discounted ex ante 
conversion profit from a type k unit at the start of t is: 
1 ) , ( ≡ ′ k k b 0 ) , ( ≡ ′ k k
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         2.4 Dynamic Market Equilibrium 
         We will now define the dynamic market equilibrium problem for a real estate 
market as consisting of two phases. To do so, we must specify how the exogenous 
variables driving the market such as incomes, demand group populations and costs will 
be changing over time. Suppose that these variables change in some arbitrary pattern for 
an extended period with each variable eventually settling on a stationary value thereafter. 
Then, the response of the real estate market will consist of two phases. In phase 1, the 
real estate market adjusts to the arbitrary time profile of the exogenous variables, by 
evolving from the given initial stocks of buildings and vacant land to an eventual 
stationary state of stocks, rents and asset prices. This adjustment requires stocks, rents 
and asset prices to change year by year until they all become stationary at some terminal 
year T and remain stationary thereafter. This stationary phase is phase 2.     
           Solving the dynamic equilibrium problem requires doing three things, illustrated in 
Figures 2 and 3. First, one must solve for the stationary (phase 2) stocks, rents and asset 
prices and this is independent of any initial conditions. This phase 2 solution can be 
obtained conditional on the stationary values of the exogenous variables only. Second, 
one must solve for the non-stationary (phase 1) stocks, rents and asset prices given only   18 
the stationary asset prices obtained from phase 2 and the initial year stocks. Third, one 
must pin down a reasonable approximation for the value of the terminal year T (i.e. for 
the length of phase 1), so that stocks, rents and asset prices for T are sufficiently close to 
their stationary (phase 2) values. This is done simply by extending the non-stationary 
phase 1 until the difference between the year T and corresponding stationary variables is 
as small as possible (Figure 3). The algorithm that we have devised (Anas and Choi 
(2001)) and which I describe in Appendix B in fact implements this solution procedure. 
In this section, we will just focus on the formal statement of this two-phase dynamic 
equilibrium problem so that the solution procedure’s basic structure can be seen and 
discussed in more detail.         
PHASE 1 (Finite Horizon Non-stationary Dynamic Equilibrium):  Given the initial 
stock vector S , the exogenous vacant land rent series R 0 , t=0,1,2…T, all other 
exogenous vectors, matrices, sets B(k) and a vector of end-of-terminal-year asset prices, 
V , a dynamic equilibrium [S t,V t,R t]
T
t satisfies (8),(9) and (10): 
0 t
1 + T 0 =
 
(8)        ∑ R t) − 0 ; k=1,…,K; t=0, 1,…,T. 
= H h hkt htP N
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V t ) = 0; k = 0,1,…,K; t=0,1,…,T.     1 +
PHASE 2 (Infinite Horizon Stationary Dynamic Equilibrium): Removing the time 
subscripts, and letting R and V denote the rents and year-end asset prices respectively 
and letting S be the stationary stocks, the dynamic equilibrium conditions in the 
stationary state (t > T) are written as: 
 
(11)         ∑ R) − 0 ; k=1,…,K. 
= H h hk hP N
... 1 ( ) ( = k ko k R q S
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V) = 0; k= 0,1,…,K.    
          Anas, Arnott and Yamazaki (2000) have used a concave mathematical 
programming approach to prove that the above two-phase problem has a unique solution   19 
and that this solution is a welfare maximum (i.e. Pareto efficient). We now turn to a 
sketch of the solution procedure. Note that there are 3K+2 equations for each t< T and 
for the stationary state. These equations have a block recursive structure as shown in 
Figure 2. (8) (and (11)) are the market clearing conditions and state that the quantity of 
building units demanded equals the supply of building units offered for rent in each 
submarket and each year. Given some sequence of stocks, [S t]
T
t , these can be solved 
simultaneously for tentative equilibrium market-clearing rents [R t]
T
t . (9) are the zero-
profit conditions or asset bid-price equations. They state that the asset prices are 
determined by competitive bidding such that zero ex ante economic profits accrue to each 
investor at the start of each year (or, equivalently, a normal expected rate of return equal 
to the exogenous interest rate, r, is earned.) Given the terminal asset prices VT  and the 
rents [R t] t from the previous step, equations (9) can be solved simultaneously for each 
t by backward recursion, for t= T, T-1, T-2,…,1,0, to find  tentative equilibrium asset 
price series [V t]
T
t . (10) are the Markovian stock adjustment equations. For each t, there 
are K+1 such equations, but one becomes redundant by the assumption that the total 
(vacant plus built-up) land is a time-invariant constant, A:  .
0 =








∑ = zt zS
z
13  Given 
the asset prices [V t]
T
t , (10) are solved by forward recursion for t=1,…,T-2, T-1,T to 
calculate new stocks [S t]
T
t . In an iterative solution algorithm, one revisits (8) with these 
new stocks, repeating the loop, (8)→(9)→(10)→(8)→… (see Figure 2). The process 
continues until  (8), (9) and (10) are jointly satisfied for all t. 
1 =
1 =
3.  Comparison of  the conventional tax with a tax on undeveloped land 
                                                            
   20 
       It is helpful to examine the role of property taxation within the model presented in 
section 2. In order to do so, it is helpful to initially analyze a version of the model  
stripped-down to its bare essentials. Suppose for example that K=1 (only one type of 
building exists). Then the model simplifies to a simple housing-land cycle [as in Anas  
and Arnott, (1993a) or its neoclassical version in Anas and Arnott (1993b)]. In any one 
year, some buildings are constructed on vacant land (if the investor owning the land is 
shocked by a low construction cost) while other buildings are demolished to create vacant 
land (if the owner is shocked by a low demolition cost or a high maintenance cost). At 
stationary state, the flow of constructions must equal the flow of demolitions in each year  
so that the stock of vacant land and the stock of buildings is constant over time. Given 
this situation, which is the simplest version of the model, I can analyze the effects of a 
variety of tax schemes on the market. I will here examine two cases. One is the 
conventional ad-valorem property tax that is levied at the same rate on both assets (vacant 
land and buildings). The other is a tax on vacant land only. What are the effects of such 
taxes on the land-to-building-to-land conversion cycle? What are their effects on the rent 
for buildings and on the asset prices of land and of buildings? 
3.1 The conventional property tax  
         With only one building type and only one land market the model equations simplify 
as follows. I also assume that all buildings are fully occupied (no vacancy rate). The tax 
is assumed paid at the beginning of each year: 
(14)  ,  0 ) ( 1 1 = − S R D
(15)  0 ln
1





























                                                                                                                                                                             
13 Lemma 2 in Anas, Arnott and Yamazaki (2000)) proves this redundancy of one of  (10) for each t.   21 
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       Let us review the notation.  is any downward sloping aggregate demand 
function for building units as a function of the rent  for buildings. As explained 
earlier, , the rent on vacant land, is exogenous and could be taken as zero without any 
loss of generality. A is the total amount of land available with   and   the stocks of 
buildings and vacant land respectively. The structural density of buildings is assumed to 
be unity and there is no loss of generality since there is only one building type. V  and V  
are the asset prices for vacant land and for a unit building respectively. Q  and  are 
the construction and demolition probabilities respectively (namely, the probabilities that 
in any one year a unit building will be demolished releasing a unit amount of land and the 
probability that a unit amount of vacant land will be built on creating a unit building.) 
These probabilities are given by the following binary logit models: 
) ( 1 R D
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It is useful to rewrite these as follows, by dividing numerator and denominator with the  
 
second exponential in the denominators: 
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This second way of writing things shows explicitly that the probability of construction  
 
on vacant land is an increasing function of the difference between the asset price of a 
building and the asset price of land, and that the probability of demolition is an  
increasing function of the difference between the asset price of land and the asset price of  
 
a building. C ,C ,C ,C are the average (non-idiosyncratic) costs of vacant land 
maintenance, demolition, construction and unit building maintenance respectively. Φ  
and Φ  are the dispersions of the idiosyncratic costs associated with land and buildings 
respectively. r is the interest rate and θ  is the property tax rate.  
00 10 01 11
0
1
        Equation (14) is the market clearing condition insuring that the demand for buildings 
equals the stock. (15) and (16) are the after-tax asset price equations for land and 
buildings respectively. These equations state that assets (vacant land and buildings) are 
valued in such a way that investors make only a normal rate of return after taking into 
account taxes, rents and expected profits from future conversions. Equation (17) is the 
stationary state condition stating that the expected quantity of buildings that are 
demolished and the expected quantity of vacant land that is developed are equal. Finally 
(18) insures that buildings and vacant land do not exceed the given total land units, A.           
         Equations (14)-(18) comprise a five equation system that must be solved for 
. This problem easily yields to conventional comparative static analysis. 
Appendix C provides the details. The key for deriving the result is to first show that 





 It states that an increase in the ad-valorem tax rate increases the rent on 




: the property tax results in   23 
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= . Since the left side is increased by a 
higher θ, so the right side must increase also. It is also easy to establish the intuitive 








: the property tax reduces the value of vacant land and 
of buildings. More important for the result we are about to establish, 0





means that the tax increases the value of vacant land relative to the value of a unit 
building. Therefore the rate of construction falls and the rate of demolition rises as one 
can see by inspection of (19′) and this is consistent with the stock of vacant land 
increasing at the expense of the stock of buildings. Because the rate of demolition 
increases while the rate of construction falls, the average age of standing buildings falls. 
Hence, as pointed out earlier, the conventional property tax – operating in the intensive 
margin – speeds up the demolition-construction cycle shortening the life span of 
buildings while, in the extensive margin, the property tax reduces the building stock.  
       This finding enriches the conventional view of the property tax. It is widely 
recognized that the property tax increases the cost of structural capital relative to the cost 
of land. This fact has been widely touted by observing that developers would use less 
structural capital relative to land when constructing buildings on a given amount of land.  
But this perspective comes from models in which demolition and reconstruction are 
ignored. Our finding says that ceteris paribus buildings would not last as long with a 
conventional property tax than without it. Hence, because the conventional property tax 
encourages more demolitions and subsequent reconstruction, it causes an excessive use of   24 
structural capital over time. If this excessive use of capital over time in the intensive 
margin outweighs the reduced use of capital due to fewer buildings in the extensive 
margin (or due to lower structural density),  then the property tax increases rather than 
decreases the total use of capital over time.   
3.2 A tax on vacant land 
 
Next we will assume that there is only one tax and it is levied on vacant land. 
This is same as the ad-valorem tax on predevelopment land value encountered in the 
literature. Note first, that this will change only equations (15) and (16). In the case of  
(16) the tax rate θ disappears (set it to zero) since buildings are not taxed. In (15) there is 
actually no change and θ  is now replaced with  which now stands for the tax rate 
levied on vacant land value. The effects of this tax on vacant land value are the opposite 
of the effects of the conventional tax analyzed above. It is easy to grasp intuitively and 
easy to prove analytically that the tax decreases the stock of vacant land because it 
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 Therefore the rate of 
construction rises and the rate of demolition falls. Thus, this unconventional tax on 
vacant land slows down the demolition-reconstruction cycle lengthening the life span of 
buildings. The average age of standing buildings increases. Hence, because this 
unconventional tax on vacant land encourages fewer demolitions and subsequent   25 
reconstruction, it discourages an excessive use of structural capital over time. The effects 
of the tax on vacant land are then the opposite of those of the conventional property tax. 
4.  An optimal taxation problem for real estate markets 
 
       How would the dynamic equilibrium formulation studied in Section 2 change in the 
presence of taxes on buildings and land?  
       Note first that the formulation captures most key variables that are active in real estate 
markets. It is possible, within this framework, to introduce a variety of tax/subsidy 
instruments on the following, for example: (a) rents; (b) asset prices; (c) costs of 
construction, demolition, maintenance and other conversions; (d) net revenues of 
investors in buildings and land (i.e. profit taxes); (e) option values. Furthermore, in each 
case, taxes can be lump-sum or ad-valorem. (For example, a lump sum tax becomes due 
when a particular conversion is made or an ad-valorem tax on conversion profits is 
levied.) Thus, it is possible – in principle – to pose a very general problem in which 
optimal tax policies are selected by picking and choosing from a large menu of such tax 
instruments that can be treated within the model.          
         Special assumptions that are built into the model will limit conclusions we may 
draw about the effects of some taxation schemes. For example, the model treats real 
estate consumers as having linear-in-income utility functions.
14 Hence, there would be no  
income effects from certain taxes/subsidies on consumers (such as income taxes). The  
same result holds on the supply side as well, because we have modeled investors as risk  
neutral.    
       To keep things simple, I will here focus only on ad-valorem taxes on asset prices. 
Thus, suppose that   is the tax rate on a type k asset (vacant land or building) in year t.  kt θ  26 
Then, each asset of type k has a tax-cost of   . Equation (9), the asset-bid price (or 
asset valuation) equation now becomes modified by deducting the cost of the tax 
(assumed paid at the beginning of each year). This modified equation is: 
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The revenue raised in year t  is then  . We can now set up a welfare 
optimization problem over the infinite time horizon t=0,1,2…T, T+1, T+2,…∞, where T 
is the terminal time T of phase one. 
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14 It is easy to change utility functions and allow income effects. See Anas and Arnott (1993c, 1994))   27 
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The objective function, which measures social welfare, consists of the three additive 
terms. Of these, the first is the non-stationary consumer surplus series of phase one 
discounted to the initial point in time. The second is the stationary-phase (phase 2) 
consumer surplus series discounted to the initial point in time. Investors make zero profit 
in each year and, because this holds by the equations (9′) and (12′) of the dynamic market 
equilibrium, their profits need not be included in the social welfare function. However, 
the introduction of taxes will alter initial asset prices and, under the assumption that the 
tax policy is unanticipated, windfall gains or losses will accrue to asset holders at time 
t=0. Hence, the level of initial asset prices must be included as the third additive term in 
(20). The constraints (11), (12′) and (13) are the stationary market equilibrium conditions 
modified for taxes. They insure that the stationary state is a market equilibrium 
conditional on the tax rates. Similarly, (8), (9′) and (10) insure that the non-stationary 
market equilibrium also holds conditional on the tax rates. The last constraint (21) 
requires that a present value tax revenue of ℜ > 0 is raised. Note that there is no 
restriction on the signs of the tax rates. Some can be negative (subsidies) while others  
are positive, but clearly at least one must be positive. 
       An alternative sub-optimal formulation would require that pre-specified revenue 
constraints must be met each year by a myopic tax planner:  for 
year t. The sub-optimality arises from the fact that the myopic tax planner cannot shift 
funds between periods but must balance his budget every period. This problem is 
considerably easier to solve because a present value budget need not be balanced across 
∑ = = ℜ −
K
k t kt kt kt S V
0 0 θ  28 
time periods. One could first solve the stationary state problem with the budget for that 
year imposed and would find the stocks, rents, asset prices and tax rates for the stationary 
state which maximized the stationary state’s consumer surplus plus aggregate asset 
values. This would determine terminal asset prices conditional on terminal-year optimal 
taxes. Then one would begin a loop of backward-in-time and forward-in-time recursions 
to find stocks and asset prices together with tax rates for each year by maximizing that 
year’s objective and still meeting the revenue target for that year. This solution procedure 
is similar to the one without taxes discussed earlier (see Figure 2) except that taxes are 
also calculated at each step.   
       A comment is in order here about welfare comparisons (deadweight loss 
measurement) for dynamic optimal taxation problems such as those discussed above. 
Figure 4 illustrates the key point. Consider first curve I, the path of the discounted 
welfare level each year when there is no tax policy in place. This welfare path is Pareto 
efficient. Now introduce any tax policy such as those discussed above. To capture the 
uses of tax revenue, the present value tax revenue ℜ can simply be added to the 
optimized value of the consumer surplus plus initial asset values since, with linear 
utilities and risk-neutral investors, the redistribution of tax revenue does not affect the 
present value welfare level. Clearly, the optimal tax policy is distortionary (has a 
deadweight loss). Therefore, curve II is either below curve I for each t, or – in the case 
shown in Figure 4 – curve II cuts curve I potentially several times (only once in the 
figure). In the case of the figure, area A must be larger than area B since the optimal tax 
policy must be distorting in present value terms. (An alternative possibility is that curve 
II starts above curve I but cuts it from above. In that case, the corresponding area B   29 
would have to be larger than the corresponding area A.) The case illustrated in the figure 
is interesting because the distortionary tax policy yields improved welfare sometime in 
the future and, in particular, in the eventual stationary state. This possibility appears 
counterintuitive at first. But the reason for it has to do with the fact that the path of the 
building stock is changed by the tax policy. At any point in time, the building stocks on 
curve I and curve II will not be the same. One can think up the following scenario that 
would be a real example of this. Suppose that the optimal tax policy calls for high taxes 
on vacant land relative to taxes on buildings. This increases the investor’s cost of holding 
vacant land which, in turn, causes buildings to be built early on so that the stock on curve 
II eventually exceeds the stock on curve I for the corresponding later time periods. This 
creates an inefficient abundance of buildings later on, causing rents to be lower and 
consumer surplus to be higher. Although consumer surplus is eventually higher on curve 
II, we know that the optimal tax policy causes a distortion in present value terms. Hence, 
area B must be smaller than area A. The example of the figure illustrates the pitfalls of 
looking only at long run benefits, ignoring the transient benefits along the adjustment 
path. It underscores that policies must be compared in terms of net present value benefits. 
5. Closing  comments 
The algorithm described in Appendix B has been designed to examine the effects of  
ad-valorem taxes on types of buildings and vacant land within the simulation model 
discussed in Section 2. It calculates the deadweight losses arising from such tax systems 
with exogenously specified tax rates. The optimal tax policy problem posed in Section 3 
has not yet been implemented as an algorithm. When so implemented, it would allow 
direct derivation of the optimal tax policy and, hence, would allow us to investigate how   30 
optimal tax policies consisting of taxes on buildings and land should vary according to 
the circumstances of particular metropolitan land markets. Given that truly neutral and 
efficient taxes on land are controversial on the basis of equity or simply difficult to 
implement, it is important to be able to compare the efficiency of alternative tax systems.     31 
Appendix A: The Multinomial Logit Calculus 
A number of references are available detailing equivalent derivations of the multinomial 
logit model and the associated welfare measures: for example, McFadden (1974) or 
Anderson et. al. (1992). This Appendix follows the approach of the latter. Part (b), below, 
can also be proved by the approach of Small and Rosen (1981) who integrated the choice 
probability function to show that the expression in (b) is the (consumer or producer) 
surplus measure. 
  
Derivation of the Multinomial Logit Model: Suppose that the payoffs (utilities or 
profits) of i = 1,…,n discrete alternatives are measured by Xi + xi where each −∞ < xi  < 
+∞ is distributed i.i.d. among the decision making agents according to the cumulative 
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Proof of (b): The procedure outlined in Anderson at. al. (1992) is to derive the 
cumulative density,  of  the random variable   and then calculate 
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       The choice probabilities (2), (4) and (6) are obtained by applying the procedure of 
part (a). To get (2), the consumer choice probabilities, define   and  , i = 
1,…,K for each ht. To get (4), the occupancy/vacancy probabilities, define 
,  , ,   for each kt. To get (6), the investor's 
conversion probabilities, define 
hit i U X ≡ hit i u x ≡




C V − +1
i X ≡ ρ  and  , all i∈  and each kt. 
The expected values (3), (5) and (7) are derived by applying the procedure of part (b). 
kit c i x − ≡ ) (k B  33 
Appendix B: FORTRAN code for solving dynamic simulation model of real estate 
markets with taxes on buildings and land 
 
Anas and Choi (2001) describes the FORTRAN code we have developed to solve 
dynamic real estate market problems described by equations (8)-(13), with exogenously 
specified tax rates. The algorithm is designed to solve problems conforming either to the 
commodity hierarchy cycle of Figure 1a or to the pattern of Figure 1b in which buildings 
differ according to structural densities. In each of these two cases, multiple land markets 
can be included, each land market containing potentially all building types.  
 
Our algorithm first solves the Phase 2 stationary equilibrium given the exogenous 
variables and calibrated parameters. Then, the algorithm solves the first phase non-
stationary dynamic equilibrium including an accurate time horizon truncation which 
determines T, the time at which the non-stationary phase converges to the stationary 
phase. The algorithm computes the deadweight losses of the pre-specified tax schemes.  
 
Under a different operating option, the user specifies key data and key elasticities of 
demand and supply. Given these inputs, the dynamic simulation model calibrates itself 
and is then poised to perform simulations with these calibrated coefficients. A variety of 
exogenous inputs including taxes can be altered to explore their inter-temporal effects on 
the real estate market.   34 
APPENDIX C: Comparative Static Analysis of the Effects of the Taxes 
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assuming that Q  or Q : the sum of the construction and demolition 
probabilities is not extremely large. Calculating the effect on rent we get: 
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. Hence, from (19′), we can see by inspection that 
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 which was inferred earlier.   35 
The comparative statics with respect to the unconventional tax on land only follows a 
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 which was inferred earlier.   36 
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Time  State of information  Investor and consumer actions 
   t  R t,V t are revealed. Investors know the 
expected values C t, D t of conversion 
and maintenance costs and their 
dispersions Φ t and φ t.  
1 +
 
Consumers earn their income y t and 
know their taste premium values of 
housing submarkets Y t. 
Risk neutral investors bid on 
housing units and land under 
perfect foresight on prices and 
under uncertainty about costs, 
determining asset prices V t, on the 
basis of R t,V t ,C t, D t, Φ tand 
φ t. 
1 +
t+ε  Idiosyncratic maintenance costs d tfor 
vacancy and occupancy are revealed for 
each housing unit as a draw from the 
double exponential with dispersions φ t. 
 
Idiosyncratic tastes u tare revealed to 
consumers as draws from the double 
exponential with dispersions δ t. 
Investors decide, based on rents,  
R t, and revealed maintenance 
costs, D t+d t,whether to keep a unit 
vacant or let it to a tenant. 
 
Consumers choose to rent in the 
most-preferred submarket, on the 
basis of net income y t−R t, taste 
premia, Y t, and the revealed 
idiosyncratic utilities u t. 
t+1−ε  Idiosyncratic conversion costs, c t, are 
revealed for each feasible k   ) (k B k ∈ → ′
conversion of a unit, as a draw from the 
double exponential with dispersions Φ t. 
Investors undertake the most 
profitable conversion on the basis 
of the revealed conversion costs 
C t+c t and V t .  1 +
t+1  R t ,V t are revealed……  1 + 2 + Risk neutral investors bid on 
housing units and land…… 
 
TABLE 1: Timeline indicating flow of information and actions of market agents within 
one year: from time t → t+1. (Note: ε>0 is a very small constant.)   39 
 
         Quality 1 
         k = 1; m   1 01=
         Quality 2 
       k = 2; m   1 02=
            Land 
      k = 0; m   1 00=
        Quality 3 
     k = 3; m   1 03=
FIGURE 1a: Buildings are of the same structural density but differ only in quality. They deteriorate in quality, 
become demolished at the lowest quality and new housing is built at the highest quality. B(0) ={0,3}, B(1) 
={0,1}, B(2) ={1,2}, B(3) ={2,3}.   
      
     High density  
    k = 1; m   8 / 1 01=
 
Medium density  
    k = 2; m   4 / 1 02=
Land 
       k = 0; m   1 00=
 
       Low density  
       k = 3; m   1 03=
FIGURE 1b: Buildings do not deteriorate in quality. Buildings are of different structural densities that
cannot be directly converted to one another. Each housing type can be demolished and any of the three 
types can be rebuilt in its place. B(0) ={0,1,2,3}, B(1) ={0,1}, B(2) ={0,2}, B(3) ={0,3}. 
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  Asset pricing [(9) solved recursively 
backward in time (t =T-1,...,0)]  




















1 ω  
Stock adjustment [(10) solved 
recursively forward in time (t = 1,...,T)] 








V t   kt ∀ = + ; 0 ) 1 = z 1
Exogenous inputs: y t, Y t, β, δ t; ∀t  
Market clearing [eq. (8) solved 
ultaneously for all t = 0,…,T]  sim
     R t    ∑ = H h hkt hP N
... 1 ( t k R q S kt kot kt ∀ > ∀ = − , 0 ; 0 ) ( )
Prices 












 [R ]    t
T
t 0 =
 Exogenous inputs: S ,Φ t,C t,m, r ; ∀t   0
Exogenous inputs: V ,Φ t,C t,m, r, φ t, D t; ∀t   T
FIGURE 2: Block-recursive structure of dynamic housing market equilibrium.   41 
 
Stock,  Skt 
Stationary state (Phase two) 





0        1         2           3         4           5          6          T                  T+1                  Time, t 
FIGURE 3: The terminal period gap in stock of type k with predetermined terminal period 
T, is |Sk
*−   SkT+1|, where Sk
*  is the stationary equilibrium stock. The longer the choice of 






    Welfare at t 
Discounted to
   Time t = 0 
t




Curve I: Path of welfare without distortionary  tax policy 
Curve II: Path of welfare with distortionary tax  policy 
AREA(A) > AREA(B) 
FIGURE 4: Negative net benefits of a distortionary tax policy in the dynamic model 
with convergence to stationary state at time T^. In this example, positive net benefits 
occur after time t
*   including T^ at which time stationary state is reached. But these 
positive net benefits are outweighed by the negative net benefits which occur in 0 < t 
< t
*.  